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A. ATM Power Resilience
It  is  a  complex  task  to  ensure  continuous  power  to  Area 
Control Centres (ACC)s. One ACC in Europe has primary and 
secondary power supplies which come from two independent 
electrical  supplies, from separate parts of the national  power 
grid.  These  supplies run  four  Diesel  Rotary  Uninterruptible 
Power Supplies (DRUPS) which convert the power to a steady, 
clean  stream  in  terms  of  phase,  harmonic  distortion  and 
without voltage spikes. The generators also each power a large 
(approximately 12  foot  diameter)  fly  wheel  which  spins 
constantly. Should the primary power supply fail, the process 
to  switch  to  the  secondary  refinery  takes  approximately six 
seconds. These fly wheels have enough stored energy to power 
the systems for approximately eleven seconds, well in excess 
of the time required to switch. This sizeable margin of error, 
within  an  already  highly  redundant  system,  highlights the 
importance and care engineered into maintaining the perpetual 
operation. In the rare instance of both these supplies failing, 
there is enough back-up fuel to run these generators for a week 
and  a  half.  For  further  details  on  air  traffic  control  power 
resistance see [13]. In the worst case scenario,  there are 110 
tonnes of batteries  which have the capacity to keep systems 
online for the couple of hours necessary to implement fail-safe 
procedures, clearing the skies and keeping air traffic safe. This 
is  also the length of time the controllers area is  rated to be 
resistant to fire. Contingency plans are also in place to transfer 
control  to  another  location  should  the  facility  no  longer be 
functional. The building designs and physical layout for critical 
infrastructures  are  often  highly  symmetrical,  with  redundant 
systems mirroring each other numerous times. This holds true 
for ATM control centres in the EU and US. If a system has 2-
fold redundancy through a single back-up system issues can 
still arise. For example, if a component fails, then human error 
in  maintenance  could  take  the  functional  component offline 
instead  of  the failed piece,  rendering  the service completely 
unavailable. Data networks, are also physically mirrored, with 
independent cabling, servers and connections acting as back-up 
systems. Often, the partition between two replicated systems is 
a physical firewall to further separate the primary systems from 
their fall-back system(s). Generally, there is a risk in having 
completely identical, duplicated redundant systems as they are 
exposed  to  Common-Cause  Failures [9].  If  conditions  arise 
which raise a dormant, underlying flaw, or software bug then 
the primary system will fail. When the failure conditions are 
applied to the duplicated system, the failure will occur again. 
As a result,  some differences between  primary  and  back-up 
systems increase the overall resilience.
B. ATM Secondary Radar Resilience
To  protect  the  mission-critical  secondary  radar  surveillance 
system, a national EU ANSP has two full network topologies. 
These architectures are fully redundant and transfer the radar 
information to distributed processing locations. Servers at these 
locations take the feeds from both network cables and examine 
the difference. Independently from the data cables,  there are 
also  two redundant  physical  connections  used  explicitly  for 
command  and  control  communications  and  network 
monitoring. The biggest loss of data observed in their systems 
is through long distance cables. Therefore this redundancy is 
exploited,  comparing  the  information  from each  source  and 
merging the feeds where applicable to get the best data on air 
traffic.  Further  still,  each radar  site is  located to overlap the 
portion of sky it can monitor. The resultant Venn diagram style 
architecture is used to further merge the combined data flow 
from each radar to select the most representative and accurate 
picture of the sky at any given moment. Once the air traffic 
positioning has been defined, this data is available for all ATM 
operators to  pull  from  the  national  network  in  a 
publish/subscribe manner. Each Air Traffic Control Operator 
(ATCO) terminal has two independent network cables ensuring 
full  resilience  against  physical  disruption across  the  system. 
Recent  work  by  Borener  and  Guzhva  [4]  highlights  the 
importance  of  resilient communication  and  surveillance 
systems on  air  traffic  separation.  Their  research shows  that 
when  these  services  experience  outages,  where  there  is  no 
access  to  the system  or  redundant  systems,  the  number  of 
Traffic  Collision  Avoidance  System Resolution  Advisory 
(TCAS) (RA) events increase considerably. These events are 
the airborne safety system warnings, designed to avoid aircraft 
coming in closer proximity to one another than the safe limits. 
In the study, they found that in the 30 minutes after a service 
outage  there  are  1.31  more  events as  compared to  the  30 
minutes  preceding  the  outage.  There  is  therefore  a  strong 
relation between the resilience of the network communications, 
as part the complete communication and surveillance systems, 
and the safety of air traffic.
C. The Risk of Change
Like most critical  infrastructures,  air travel for passengers is 
currently very safe with worldwide fatal  accident  rates from 
1997 to 2006 at 0.79 fatal accidents per million flights flown or 
0.49 per million hours flown [16]. More recently, metrics show 
significant improvements in fatal accident rates worldwide [1]. 
Changes  to the system are  often  perceived  as  a  risk,  yet  in 
order to maintain these high safety standards, changes are often 
necessary. Safety calculations are made in numerous ways with 
risk probabilities, likelihood matrices and fault trees [12]. Such 
models are based on a strong understanding of the physics and 
engineering  involved  in  flying, weather,  etc.  Each  of  these 
areas  is  well  understood.  Innovation, however,  can  cause 
unknown safety issues such as the use of lithium ion batteries 
in aircraft [6]. Data networks and software services which run 
are open to a multitude of issues which can be hard to define, 
from hardware malfunctions to software misconfiguration and, 
when components are updated, the new interactions amongst 
the virtual data systems can be challenging to comprehend and 
predict. The safety modelling for such aspects is very complex, 
time consuming and expensive. ANSPs have multiple systems 
and  testbeds. Some software  or  networking  updates  can  be 
tested  for  months prior  to  deployment  on  an  active  system. 
Errors will  always occur and therefore the different back-up 
system configurations are in use. However, sometimes making 
a change can be necessary due to a known flaw in a piece of 
software.  Often  the  software patch  or  upgrade  can  be 
considered a greater risk for fear that the patch itself is not safe. 
If changes to the software or network infrastructure are made 
on the  secondary  systems,  this  leaves  the  primary  systems 
unprotected from the original flaw or error [3]. Hence, whilst 
the physical aspects of data networks redundancy are similar to 
power  supply,  maintaining  the  data  and  information  flow 
aspects is significantly more complex.
III. RECENT DISRUPTIVE INCIDENTS
Despite the physical redundancies in ATM, vulnerabilities still 
exist and can lead to serious incidents if they are not suitably 
mitigated. In November 2009, the FAA Telecommunications 
Infrastructure  (FTI)  experienced  a  four-hour  outage  causing 
system-wide delays and disruption for  over 800 flights.  The 
incident was managed safely with contingency plans in effect 
allowing ATCOs to manually manage flight plan data. The FTI 
services  are  designed  to  meet  the  NAS  service 
telecommunication  performance  goals  (independent  of  site-
specific architecture).  These give maximum restoration times 
for service classifications: Critical: 6 sec; Essential: 6x102 sec; 
Routine:  6x103sec.  This  outage  was  nearly 2.5 times longer 
than the acceptable Routine service outage. The incident report 
[7] states this outage was the product of a cascading series of 
events which resulted from errors introduced into the external 
provider’s  network  maintenance and  network  monitoring 
processes. During earlier scheduled maintenance, an incorrect 
routing  table  was  programmed  into  the  infrastructure.  This 
remained dormant until the Los Angeles router was restarted in 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
